The Twenty-fifth Congress of the CPSU on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory, analyzing the experience and results of previous work and defining the tasks of the next period of struggle for the building of communism, stressed that "the problem of ideological struggle increasingly comes to the fore, and the truth about socialism is the most powerful tool in this struggle.".

Plutarch, in his work,_ Peri __Deisidaimon_ia_ __,_ presents a striking portrayal of superstition in the First Century. The Philosopher who also served for decades as a priest of Apollo portrays the pernicious effects of some supposed religious practices as worse than the outcome of atheism. His position constitutes a forceful explanation to ostensibly controversial socio-religious behaviours. This article discusses some of the priest’s concerns as well as his rebuff of religious attitudes that are borne out of what he describes as (...) misrepresentation of the gods or superstition. Plutarch’s essay is seen as illustrating a reason for a socio-religious situation in Africa, a continent that shares a similar religious background with the world of the writer. Specifically, with the example of the hard fight against street begging in some parts of Nigeria, the article shows how social reform programmes could fail when effects of traditional African beliefs and cultural practices remain potent. __. (shrink)

In October-2010 the headlines of the science press were dominated by the announcement of the discovery of a “Goldilocks Planetâ€, Gleise 581g, which has a mass not too different from that of the Earth and has an orbit squarely in the middle of the habitable zone of its parent star. It was supposed to be not too hot, not too cold, but just right for the evolution of life. Steven Vogt of UC Santa Cruz, the lead author of the paper, (...) was quoted (out of context) as saying, “The chances of life on the planet are 100%.†Now that some of the dust has settled concerning this reported discovery, I’d like to have a look at the work behind the announcement and consider its present status. (shrink)

Two years ago, astrophysicists studying Type Ia supernovas discovered that our universe is a much stranger place than we had imagined, with invisible vacuum energy accelerating its expansion. (See my column about this in the May-1999 Analog.) However, new astrophysical observations from the BOOMERanG experiment (Balloon Observations Of Millimetric Extragalactic Radiation and Geomagnetics), a balloon-borne cryogenic microwave telescope measurement that flew at an altitude of about 24 miles over the Antarctic, indicate that our universe is also rather ordinary, in that (...) its space is maximally flat. The term “flat” as used here means that the space of our universe is neither positively curved like a ball or negatively curved like a potato chip. It appears that in our universe, the tendencies of space toward positive curvature from gravitational attraction and towards negative curvature from expansion kinetic energy are precisely in balance, leaving space on the average completely free of curvature. (shrink)

Frente a una narrativa distópica presente en los medios de comunicación y cultura popular que caracteriza el avance y desarrollo de la inteligencia artificial como una amenaza o riesgo existencial (e.g. desempleo tecnológico, sistemas de armas autónomas letales, robots asesinos, propaganda política computacional etc.) quiero valorar de manera crítica y constructiva el rol de la inteligencia artificial para el bien común (AI4SG). La tecnología digital también se puede aplicar para la solución de grandes problemas de la humanidad, como los 17 (...) Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible y sus 169 metas de la agenda 2030. En este artículo, comentaré distintos casos de uso y aplicación de la inteligencia artificial y la robótica encaminados a conseguir los 17 Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible y qué principios éticos deben guiar su aplicación para que la inteligencia artificial consiga la ambiciosa agenda 2030. También comentaré el plan de acción de España y la estrategia nacional para cumplir la agenda 2030 y de qué manera incorpora las TIC. (shrink)

Grigorii Savvich Skovoroda was a distinguished philosopher of the eighteenth century Ukraine who made a significant contribution to the development of philosophical thought and enlightenment ideas. A contemporary of N. I. Novikov, Ia. P. Kozel'skii, and A. I. Radishchev, he reflected in his work the protest of the laboring peasant masses against serfdom. This protest was the starting point for his philosophical interpretation of the world, man, problems of social justice, and the paths along which they could be resolved. Representing (...) the antifeudal movement for enlightenment in the Ukraine, he linked the freedom of his people to unification of the Ukraine with Russia and to the general struggle for implementation of anti-serfdom ideals. (shrink)

This is the first volume in a three-volume work that explores the influence of G.W.F. Hegel’s philosophical thinking in Golden Age Denmark. The work demonstrates that the tradition of Danish Hegelianism played a profound role in many spheres of the Golden Age culture.

In seinem Sendschreiben an Fichte aus dem Jahr 1799 bekennt F.H. Jacobi emphatisch, daß er Fichte für »den wahren Meßias der speculativen Vernunft, den echten Sohn einer Verheißung einer durchaus reinen in und durch sich selbst bestehenden Philosophie« halte: »Eine reine, das ist, durchaus immanente Philosophie, eine Philosophie aus Einem Stück, ein wahrhaftes Vernunft-System, ist auf die Fichtesche Weise allein möglich«.

The author presents and defends three theses: (1) "the first is that it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology." (2) "the second is that the concepts of obligation, And duty... And of what is morally right and wrong, And of the moral sense of 'ought', Ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible...." (3) "the third thesis is that (...) the differences between the well-Known english writers on moral philosophy from sidgwick to the present day are of little importance." (staff). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:I. The Concept of Beatific EnjoymentThe locus classicus for the medieval scholastic discussion of beatific enjoyment is the first distinction of Book I of Peter Lombard's Sentences. Lombard extracts three distinct formulations of the term "enjoyment" from Augustine's writings. The first formulation is borrowed from the first book of Augustine's treatise On Christian Learning . The formulation states that "to enjoy is to inhere with love in something for (...) its own sake." The other two formulations are taken from Book X of Augustine's work On the Trinity . The first reads as follows: "we enjoy the things that we know, when the will rests, by delighting in them for their own sake." The second says that "to enjoy is to use with gladness , not merely through hope, but already in reality." These truncated statements served as technical definitions of the concept of enjoyment in scholastic Sentences commentaries. It was thought that the definitions call attention to the various psychological factors required for enjoyment to occur. For instance, the theologian Alexander of Hales explains that the definitions reveal distinct aspects of enjoyment with respect to the subject experiencing it and with respect to the object motivating the enjoyment. The expression "to inhere with love" refers to the soul on the part of the subject and to God on the part of the object. The saying "to use with gladness" relates to the power of the soul on the side of the subject and to created beatitude on the side of the object. Finally, the phrase "we enjoy the things that we know" corresponds to the faculty of the will as well as to the uncreated divine persons. Alexander would thus say that an adequate treatment of Augustine's concept of enjoyment must take into account the subject involved in the activity of enjoyment – e.g., the human soul, the faculty of the will, the faculty of cognition, etc. – and the object or objects of an act of enjoyment – created beatitude, the persons of the Trinity, or simply God.A slightly different reading of Augustine's definitions of enjoyment is found in Thomas Aquinas's Sentences commentary. In his literal exposition of the first distinction of Lombard's Sentences, Thomas notes that a perfect definition of a thing must disclose all of its proper causes. He then offers an explanation of the way in which Augustine's three definitions aim to clarify the concept of enjoyment. According to Thomas, the statement "to inhere in something with love for its own sake" portrays the act of enjoyment in relation to the object as a thing worthy for its own sake and the habit of love causing the enjoyment. The second formulation – "we enjoy the things that we know, etc." – links the act of enjoyment with the faculty of cognition required for the activation of the will. The third formulation – "to enjoy is to use with gladness" – refers primarily to the property of delight , which accompanies the obtainment of the desired object and perfects the act of enjoyment. Thomas, thus, identifies three factors contributing to the occurrence of an act of enjoyment – habit, cognition, and delight . In the first article of the first question of his commentary on Book I of the Sentences, Thomas states that enjoyment is the ultimate happiness of a human being. Enjoyment requires the clear intellectual vision of God, it involves an union as well as a sort of a mutual penetration through love between the one who sees and the thing that is seen, and it culminates in supreme delight . Thomas also says that enjoyment is an act of the will manifesting the habit of charity. In his Summa theologiae Ia IIae, Thomas defines enjoyment as an act of the appetitive faculty , and.. (shrink)

resumo No chama do período do “estrutura l i s mo” defendeu-se a id é ia de que havia uma oposição ent re essa filosof ia e o idealismo, especia l mente o ide a l i s mo subjetivo. O propósito deste texto é defender a tese oposta, de que há um forte elo interno entre o criticismo kantiano e o método estrutural em história da filosofia. Esse elo é partic u l a r me nte visível no estrutura (...) l i s mo e na Dia no e m á t ica de Gueroult e também pode ser ilustrado na obra do grande intérprete da filosofia kantiana que é Louis Guillermit. Este aplicou seu método de “elucidação crítica” à interpretação da sistematicida de de todo o período crítico de Ka nt e especia l me nte da constituição pro g ressiva da Estética transcendental nas três Críticas. A eluc idação da gênese das estruturas perma nece int e r na ao sistema ka ntia no, de i xando em aberto a questão da natureza de sua ligação com os sistemas pós-kantianos, mas essa neutralida de é mais apare nte que real, e cons o a nte com a escolha do idealismo kantia no em detrimento do idealismo hegeliano. palavras- chave Estrutura l i s mo; Dia no e m á t ica; elucidação crítica; Ma r t ial Gueroult; Louis Guillermit; Idealismo alemão. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:POMPONAZZI'S CRITIQUE OF AQUCNAS'S ARGUMENTS FOR THE :IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL JOHN L. TRELOAR, S.J. Marquette University Milwaukee, Wisconsin I. lntJroWi.wtion IN 'JiHE COURSE of hls discussion on the immortality of the soul, Pietro Pomponazzi systematically critiques the Pfatonic, Avel'IJ'IOist, and Thomistic positions concerning this perennial problem iin the philosophy of human nature. Pomponiazzi's Tractatrus de irnrmortalitate animae 1 is inteirestin!g from three methodological standpoints: (1) the criteria Pomponazzi (...) uses to ev:aluate the various positions, (2) Pomponazzi 's attempt to redefine the probtlem of immortality in fo:gica;l terms, and (8) his analysis of previous positions. In this Renaissance treatise one finds an excellent example of the infliuence of method on the dev:elopment of an idea. This article wiihl eX'amine and ev:aluate Pomponazzi's analy,s:i.s of Thomas A:quiinas's aJ.'gument for the immortality of the soul showing how Pomponazzi''S irefo:rnnula;bion puts the Thomistic argument in a context completely differoort fmm whait Thomas himself intended. Although this ipaper treats a historical pr01blem, its mai:i.n oibject is to show how the fo:tmulation of phifosophical critema and,questions influences how one handles a topic 1 and 1 The standard Latin text of the Tractatus is: Petrus Pomponatus, Tractatus de immortalitate animae, ed. Gianfranco Morra (Bologna: Nanni and Fiammeghi, 1954). The English translations used in this article are from Ernst Cassirer et al., eds. The Renaissance Philosophy of Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948). A complete translation of the Tractatus by William Henry Hay II, revised by John Herman Randall, Jr., and annotated by Paul Oskar Kristeller, appears on pp. 280-381. 458 454 JOHN L. TRELOAR, S.J, what one says about prewous solutions to a problem. This article, then, studies a rphi1osophica1l methodology as much as it arppraises Pomrponazzi and Aquinas.2 Eady in the Tractatus de immortalitate animae Pomponazzi 'es'tia;bJishes the dual cr1iter:ia for judging the adequacy of au p!i.'evious arguments ]or the immortaJl~ty of the,soul. First, "Leaving aside revefaition and miracles, and remaining entirely within natmal limits," 3 what can be said concerrning the immortality of the soul? Second, "what... was Aristotle's opin~on on the same question "?4 These criteria function as the limiting conditions that determine the adequacy of any argument :for immortality; Pomponazzi employs these criteria riJgm~ously to test whether previious a1rguments are adeqU'ate. Pomponazzi's attempt to l'edefine immo:rtality in strictly 1ogicail terms also influences his critique of pl'evious authoi's :and his own generail condusions. He picks u:p Fieino'.s notion that the human being is of an ambiguous nature, that is, part spirit 1and pa:rt oorpore1 al.5 This, of course, is new neither with Ficino nor with Pomponazzi, for the concept of a twofold nature goes hack at least as ia1· as Plwto. Plomponazzi',s use of 1this concept of a twofold nature, however, is unique. He casts the whole 2 In his book Renaissance Thought and Its Sources (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), Paul Oskar Kristeller says, "Among the many problems and concepts that have occupied the thinkers of the past, and especially those of the Renaissance, the doctrine of immortality seems especially remote from the discussions and concerns of our time" (p. 181). He argues in this essay that, "The problem is still with us, and we may hope that it may yet lead to new answers that are more in accordance with our knowledge and our sensibilities than those transmitted to us by the thinkers of the past, especially those of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries" (p. 196). s "Primum scilicet, quid, revelationibus et miraculis semotis, persistendoque pure infra limites naturales, hac in re sentis." Immortalitate, p. 36 (p. 281). All references to the Traatatus de immortalitate animae will appear in this form. The first page reference is to the Latin text and the page number in parentheses is to the English translation cited above. 4 "Alterum vero, quamnam sententiam Aristotelis in eadem materiam fuisse censes." Imrnortalitate, p. 36 (p. 281). 5 See Marsilius Ficino, " Five Questions Concerning the... (shrink)

resumo O propósito deste artigo é o de discutir em linhas gerais a relação entre método e me t a f í s ica na filosof ia de Descartes. Pre t e ndemos fazê-lo me d ia nte a cont raposição das Meditações de filosofia primeira às Regras para a direção do espírito quanto a alguns temas em comum. Nosso objetivo principal é questio nar o papel desempenhado pela evid ê nc ia intelectual no cont exto epistemo l ó g (...) ico das Regras e no cont exto metafísico das Meditações. Retoma ndo, num prime i ro mo me nto, algumas int e r p retações sobre o assunto e discutindo, num segundo momento, a natureza da dúvida e a noção de evidênc ia nas Meditações, pro c u ramos concluir com a sugestão de que no sistema cartesia no tem lugar um conflito de ordem estrutural entre método e metafísica.palavras-chave método; metafísica; evidência; dúvida; idéia; existência. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:86. THE HUME LITERATURE FOR 1977 In my recently-published book, Fifty Years of Hume Scholarship: A Bibliographical Guide (Edinburgh University Press, 1978; ^ 5.50), the reader will find a thorough coverage of the Hume literature from 1925 to 1976, with lists of the main earlier writings on Hume, all indexed by author, language, and subject. What follows here will bring the record up to the end of 1977.· Readers (...) are invited to inform me of any omissions. The intention is to maintain a complete bibliographical record of critical work on Hume, by the regular publication in Hume Studies of an annual bibliography covering the previous year, with addenda consisting of items omitted through ignorance in previous years. The following abbreviations of journal titles are used here: APQ American Philosophical Quarterly JHI Journal of the History of Ideas JHP Journal of the History of Philosophy JP Journal of Philosophy PAS Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society PB Philosophical Books PBA Proceedings of the British Academy PQ Philosophical Quarterly PR Philosophical Review RIP Revue Internationale de Philosophie RM Review of Metaphysics TLS Times Literary Supplement Other abbreviations should be obvious enough, and mainly follow the British Standard. ÄRDAL, P. S. 'Convention and Value',in G. P. Morice, David Hume, Bicentenary Papers,51-68. Edinburgh. ÁRDAL, P. S. 'Another Look at Hume'sAccount of Moral Evaluation', JHP 15, 405-21. 87. BERK, E.? Note on Hume's Treatise I. iv. 1', Mind 86, 118-19. BERLIN, I. 'Hume and the Sources of German Anti-Rationalism', in Morice, op. cit., 95-116. BERRY, C. J. 'From Hume to Hegel: The Case of the Social Contract', JHI 38, 691-703. BOTWINICK, A.? Case for Hume's Nonutilitarianism', JHP 15, 423-35. BRADLEY, M. C. 'Stove on Hume', Australas. J. Phil. 55, 69-73. BRANDT, R. 'The Beginnings of Hume's Philosophy', in Morice, op. cit., 117-27. BRICKE, J. 'Hume on Self-Identity, Memory and Causality', in Morice, op. cit., 167-74. BRITTON, K. 'Hume on some Non-Natural Distinctions', in Morice, op. cit., 205-9. BURKS, A. W. Chance, Cause, Reason, esp. 128-42 ('Hume's thesis on the justification of induction'). Chicago. CASSIDY, J. 'The Nature of Hume's Inductive Scepticism: A Critical Notice', Ratio 19, 47-54. (on Stove 1973) COHEN, E. D. 'Hume's Fork', Sth. J. Phil. 15, 443-55. CONNON, R. W. 'The Textual and Philosophical Significance of Hume's MS Alterations to Treatise III ', in Morice, op. cit., 186-204. [PQ 28 (1978), 265-8] CONNON, R. W. & POLLARD, M. On the Authorship of "Hume's" Abstract', PQ 27, 60-6. CORSANO, A. 'Vico et Hume face au problème religieux', Archives de Phil. 40, 241-50. DAVIE, G. E. 'Edmund Husserl and "the as yet, in its most important respect, unrecognised greatness of Hume",' in Morice, op. cit., 69-76. DAVIS, J. W. 'Hume on Qualitative Content', in Morice, op. cit., 175-80. DELEULE, D. Hume, Lettre d'un Gentilhomme à son ami d'Edimbourg, présentation, traduction et notes. Paris. (French translation, with facing original, of A Letter from a Gentleman, Edinburgh, 1745) 88. DÉME", N. 'La Méthode Newtonienne et les Lois Empiriques de l'Anthropologie dans Traité II', in Morice, op. cit., 139-45. FORBES, D. 'Hume's Science of Polities', in Morice, op. cit., 39-50. FORCE, J. E. 'Hume in the Dialogues, the Dictates of Convention, and the Millennial Future State of Biblical Prophecy', S. -west. J. Phil. 8, 131-41. GAWLICK, G. 'Hume and the Deists: a Reconsideration', in Morice, op. cit., 128-38. GLOSSOP, R. J. 'In defence of David Hume', Australas. J. Phil. 55, 59-63. GLOUEERMAN, M. 'Hume on Modes', Hume Studies 3, 32-50. GUPTA, B. 'Buddha and Hume: A Popular Comparison Revisited ', Int. Phil. Q. 17 (1977), 135-46. HALL, R. 'The Hume Literature for 1976', Hume Studies 3, 94-102. HEALY,. M. 'Substance and Spiritual Substance - A criticism of David Hume', Alethe ia (Irving, Texas) 1 (1977), 159-83. HEDENIUS, I. Filosofien i ett föränderligt samhälle, 37-59 ( ' Värdeteorierna hos Hume': the value-theories in Hume). Stockholm. HINCKFUSS, I. 'Stove, Induction and the Irish', Australas. J. Phil. 55, 64-8. HISKES... (shrink)

A intenção deste artigo é primàriamente exegética. Não pretende chegar a conclusães filosóficas substanciais nem fazer uma apreciação crítica. Pretende simplesmente esclarecer a versão de Russell quanto ao atomismo lógico, apresentando a sua teoria do juízo empírico num contexto histórico. A maior parte dos comentários contemporâneos falham neste ponto; contudo, afigura-se impossível compreender perfeitamente a teoria de Russell aeerca do conhecimento, bem como a Teoria das Descrições, como parte integrante daquela teoria, se não for encarada como uma tentativa para evitar (...) as consequencias de certas teorias alternativas do juízo. Pensa o autor que muitas críticas contemporâneas da Teoria das Descrições estão deslocadas, simplesmente por não conseguirem apreender o papel que aquela teoria devia desempenhar na análise russelliana do juízo empírico. A título de exemplo tenta o autor mostrar como as críticas de P. F. Strawson a respeito da Teoria das Descrições, como foram formuladas no seu artigo On Referring, não vêm a propósito (cf. Secção VT). A principal comparação histórica aqui apresentada refere-se à teoria idealista do juízo de F. H. Bradley. Contudo, parece também importante salientar o acordo que existe entre Russell e Bradley quanto a rejeitar como inadequado o tipo de análise do juízo apresentado por Leibniz e, numa primeira etapa da sua carreira, por G. E. Moore. Leibniz e Moore apresentaram, em moldes diversos, aquilo a que podíamos chamar teorias 'essencialmente genéricas' do juízo. Para Leibniz uma proposição é uma conexão analitica de conceitos, para Moore uma proposição é uma conexão sintética de conceitos. Tanto Russell como Bradley afirmam que é impossível formular uma teoria do juízo satisfatória, se concebermos a relação entre uma mente e uma proposição, implicada no juízo, como uma simples conexao de conceitos. O juízo deve ser apresentado como algo que implica experiência imediata pré-conceitual, experiência essa que, embora em si mesma não seja capaz de verdade ou falsidade, está pressuposta na própria possibilidade de qualquer juízo, verdadeiro ou falso, acerca da realidade. Dum modo geral, podíamos dizer que um juízo, cujo conteúdo é conceitual, é em virtude da experiência imediata que 'atinge a realidade' ('reaches right up to reality'). Contudo, embora Russell e Bradley concordem neste ponto, a análise da experiência imediata apresentada pelo primeiro é muito diferente da do segundo. Na medida em que se pode falar duma tese exegética positiva neste artigo, dir-se-ia que a análise russelliana da experiência imediata, contida na sua doutrina do 'conhecimento por experiência directa' dos particulares na sensação, é formulada especificamente (a) para ser compatível com a existência dum universo pluralista de particulares externamente relacionados e (b) para permitir uma versão da teoria de correspondência da verdade. Por outras palavras, a análise russelliana do juízo empírico, implicando necessàriamente um 'conhecimento por experiência directa' dos particulares na sensação, foi formulada especìficamente para evitar as consequências que, tanto Bradley como Russell, viram seeguir-se da análise idealista do juízo. Isto ilustra uma diferença fundamental entre o método filosófico de Russell e o de Bradley. Bradley aceita o monismo, a irrealidade das relações externas, e a teoria de coerência da verdade como consequência da sua teoria inicial do juízo. Russell, por outro lado, pensa que estas consequências se tornaram inaceitáveis perante a prática e as descobertas da ciência empírica; e tenta, por isso, construir uma teoria do juízo compatível com o tipo de metafísica e com a teoria da verdade, que lhe parece serem exigidos pela ciência empírica. (Resumo do Autor. Trad. A. M.). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE CONCEPT OF PERSON IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS: A Contribution to Recent Discussion* ST. THOMAS AQUINAS accepted and consistently defended Boethius' definition of person: "persona est substantia individua rationalis naturae." St. Thomas' analysis of this definition necessarily involves metaphysical questions because of the implications of the terms " substance" and " nature" and moreover it manifests the inescapahle imprint of the theological problematics which surrounded the issue (e.g. the (...) Trinity and the hypostatic union). Both of these influences, metaphysical and theological, have engendered problems of interpretation and criticism. Contemporary discussions of person largely either continue the scholastic controversies or adopt a modern perspective from which to expose apparent contradictions in St. Thomas' doctrine. The purpose of this article will be limited to a consideration of the metaphysical problems concerning the relationship between individual substance, universal, nature, and existence. It is hoped that such a clarification will resolve not only the neoscholastic controversies, but also some of the contemporary problems. I. BOETHIUS' DEFINITION OF PERSON AND ST. THOMAS' EXPLANATION A. BOETHIUS' DEFINITION Boethius develops his definition of person in the Liber contra Eutychen et N estorium after a careful consideration of na- * I have to thank cordially Father Brian Shanley, 0.P. for having revised completely this English version, devoting much time and energy to fit the text and the footnotes to the style of The Thomist. He adapted the version in good style and verified the Latin quotations. 435 436 HORST SEIDL ture and substance.1 In the first chapter he sets out to define nature and discovers four possible meanings. The first and broadest definition, embracing both substances and accidents, describes nature as belonging to all things which by their being can be in some way or another be comprehended by reason: "natura est earum rermn quae, cum sint, quoquo modo intellectu capi possunt." A second definition, comprising substances alone both corporeal and incorporeal, describes nature as anything that can effect or suffer something: " natura est vel quod facere vel quod pati possit." A third sense, taken from the Aristotelian analysis of the motion of natural substances, describes nature as the immanent principle of movement : "natura est motus principium per se et non per accidens." Finally, nature can also refer to the formal cause which provides the specific difference: " natura est unam quamque rem informans specifica differentia" (cf. ST Ia. 29, I ad 4). It is this last sense which is most important. In sum, "nature" is a broad term encompassing both composite beings and their causes. Boethius continues in chapter two by first narrowing the relevant sense of nature to substances (thus excluding accidents ) and then presenting a complete division of substances. The major distinction is between corporeal substances and incorporeal substances. Corporeal subdivides further into inanimate and animate, with animate dividing. into insensitive and sensitive and the latter dividing finally into irrational and rational. Incorporeal subdivides into rational and irrational (the life-principle of animals), with rational incorporeal substances being further distinguished into those that are immutable by nature (the Creator) and those that are not so by nature (the human soul and angels) but may become so by virtue of the immutable substance. Boethius then argues that person cannot be affirmed of inanimate beings or irrational animals. A 1 All citations from Boethius are taken from the Loeb text in Boethius: Theological Tractates and the Consolation of Philosophy, ed. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918). THE CONCEPT OF PERSON IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 437 final distinction of :substance into universal and particular leads to the conclusion that person must refer to an individual. Thus the background is set for the definition of person which opens the third chapter: " naturae rationalis individua substantia." Person must be an individual substance of a certain nature, namely rational, which nature accounts for the form or specific difference of the particular substance (the fourth meaning of chapter 1). The connection of this definition with Aristotle 's definition of man as a rational animal is unmistakable. It should also be noted that this definition of person is applicable not only to man, in whom the rational nature is not identical with his substance, but also to the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:CATHOLICISM, PUBLIC THEOLOGY, AND POSTMODERNITY: ON RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS'S " CATHOLIC MOMENT" DAVID L. SCHINDLER University of Notre Dame HAT CATHOLICS should assume.their rightful place m the task of forming a culture, and indeed shaping a public philosophy in and for a pluralistic, dernocrwtic society, is ia suggestion which has not often been heard in the history of American culture, and certainly not from. nonCatholics. It is a suggestion (...) thrut Richard John Neuhaus, a Lutheran pastor, nonetheless makes with eloquence and wit in The Catholic Moment.1 The book makes for enjoyable and even exciting reading. It is difficult for a Catholic, even of a non-itriumphalistic sort, nort rto be moved by his suggestion: not to be stimulated into rserious ~efl.ection upon the meaning of Catholic identity, particularly now in the pT"esent cultural situation in America and indeed the West, which seems-note the subtitle of Neuhaus's book-aptly described in terms of a modernity giving way to posrtmodernity, a modernility searching for genuinely postmodern patterns of thought. Neuhaus is insistent-and the insistence is refresb.ing-,that this reflection be carried through with integri,ty (cf., e.g., p. 150) : the Catholicism. for which our-a postmodern-culture [.g ripe is and must be ·a Caitholicisrn which is fiaithful to the Gospel and to tits own tradition. This double intention of Neuhaus to speak on behalf of a Catholicism which is in and for a postmodern world sets.the context for.the questions I wish to pose in the present inquiry. The meaning of Neuhaus's Catholic moment is twofold: 1 The Catholic Moment: The Parado11J of the Church in the Postmodern World, by Richard John Neuhaus (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987). All references in the text are to this book. 107 108 DAVID L. SCHINDLER [It] is the moment in which the Roman Catholic Church in the world can and should be the lead church in proclaiming and exemplifying the Gospel. This can and should also be the moment in which the Roman Catholic Church in the United States assumes its rightful role in the culture-forming task of constructing a religiously informed public philosophy for the American experiment in ordered liberty (p. 282). In.the light of this ~statement, and indeed of the overarching context md[ca;ted by the suhbitle of his book, I wish to direct attention in whait follows to three issues: what Neuhaus takes to be an authentic Catholic Christianity ·and Catholic Christian rtheology (tha;t is, a Christianity which iis f.aithful in" proc1aiming and exemplifyiing the Gospel ") ; what he takes to be the proper sense (the sense required by Ca.tholic Christianity) of the itask of forming ·a culture and " constructing a religiously informed public philosophy" in and for a plumlistic, democrrutic society such as that of America; and finally what he takes to be the ·appropriate sense of this fask in a world which he distinguishes as postmodern. Now Neuhaus develops his response to these issues in terms of wha;t he calls a paradoxical relation between the Church and the world. My purpose in what follows, therefore, will be to e:x;amine the meaning he accords " Catholic, " public," ·and "postmodern," m terms of this central notion of " paradox." I. In his discussion of the relation betwen rthe Church and the world, Neuhaus provides a sketch of the five types proposed by H. Richard Niebuhr (pp. 16ff.). These are: the Church against the world, the Church of the world, the Church above the world, the Church and the world in paradox, and the Church as the transformer of the wor1cl. The first, "the Church against the world," iis what is often identified as a sectarian model, evident for ex;ample in monasticism and in such communities ·as the Hutterites and Mennonites. The second type, " The Church of the world," can be exemplified in nmeitrenth century l.iberial theology 00:d its promotion of a THE CATHOLIC MOMENT 109 " cultural Protesitantism," wherein " rel[gion W18iS to be placed at the service of the besrt in the evolution of society" (p. 19). The model which views: the- Chur'Ch ia;s a transformer of the world "smacks... (shrink)

The Irish poet W. B. Yeats once wrote, with great sapience and perception: Nor dread, nor hope attend A dying animal; A man awaits his end Dreading and hoping all. That death has ever been a problem to man is attested as far back as we can trace our species in the archaeological record—indeed, it seems to have been a problem even for that immediate precursor of homo sapiens, the so-called Neanderthal Man; for he buried his dead.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:248 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY be taken from a philosophical point of view. Since it is not certain whether the author of the Prolegomena was or was not a Christian (p. xlix), "god" should not be capitalized, and the translation of T&~ia 5~l~ttovo'f~l~taTa as "God's creation" at IV. 15. 6 is actually misleading. Moreover, for no apparent reason, 0~oX07tz6gis translated as "metaphysical" in the first four chapters, but as "theological" (...) thereafter. Inaccuracies are very few indeed. "Ungrateful" is peculiar for o~5~5t• at I. 2. 25, and so is "adapted state" for ~to~tTe[a~ ~no~ae0g at I. 5.35; X. 26. 38, 40, and 44; at II. 10. 11, there is no need to translate o~Te&0t~6)g bu~yovxctL as "they do not aim at accurate expression," and on p. 32, line 1, "as yet" is not in the Greek of the Prolegomena, although it should have been, if the Anonymous had quoted correctly from Plato, Phaedrus 229 E. But this is trifling criticism of a work which leaves nothing to be desired in any other respect, and which displays the same high qualities of scholarship which we have come to expect of the author on the basis of his earlier achievements. MARTIN OSTWALI) Swarthmore College The Fountain of Life (Fons Vitae). By Solomon ibn Gabirol (Avicebron). Specially abridged edition, translated from the Latin by Harry E. Wedeck, with an Introduction by Theodore E. James. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1962. Unpaged introduction, 133 pp. $4.75.) The romance of the nineteenth-century discovery, by Salomon Munk, that "Avicebron's" Fons Vitae, a major source of neoplatonic thought in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, was actually the work of the eleventhcentury Hispano-Jewish poet, Solomon ibn Gabirol, and has often been retold. It is, indeed, a remarkable story. Perhaps its most noteworthy feature is that it reveals how closely alike Muslim, Jewish, and Christian philosophers were; by implication, then, it indicates that theological considerations were of less importance in medieval philosophy than is suggested by most historical accounts. Although the story of The Fountain of Lqe has now become an oft-told tale, the work itself has never been available in English dress. The present edition remedies this situation in part. It presents Tract III of the original text, a section dealing with the existence of simple spiritual substances. Harry Wedeck's translation is lucid and readable. Theodore E. James's introduction is useful for the beginning student but too elementary to be of much use to a more advanced reader. It is good that there is now this much to recommend to our students; we may hope that the day will come when BOOK REVIEWS 249 larger sections of the work will be translated-preferably not from the Latin, but from the Arabic original. JOSEPHL. B~u Columbia University Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Trans. by John P. Rowan. (Chicago, Illinois: Henry Regnery Company, 1961. Pp. xxiii + 955.2 vols., boxed, $25.00.) Generally speaking, the two Summae of St. Thomas, long available in English translation, contain all that is most personal and most profound in his philosophical thought. Nonetheless, it is quite impossible to get a fully adequate conception of St. Thomas' place in the history of western thought from a consideration of his theological writings alone. Hence, by translating St. Thomas' Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle into English, Professor J. P. Rowan has provided the non-Latin reading student of the history of philosophy an invaluable service. For it is in his r61e as Aristotelian commentator that we see St. Thomas creating for the Schoolmen a version of Aristotle which served to render the Stagirite's thought into terms which became fundamental to the philosophical defense of Christianity. Further, by keeping in mind the fully-developed notions of St. Thomas on the existence of God and the nature of being as these are given us to understand in the Summae, the reader becomes better enabled, by a critical reading of Thomas' Commentary, to grasp the sense in which the Saint's theological writings are said by his enthusiasts to represent a "completing" and "perfecting" of... (shrink)

A relative tensor calculus is formulated for expressing equations of mathematical physics. A tensor time derivative operator ▽ b a is defined which operates on tensors λia...ib. Equations are written in a rigid, flat, inertial or other coordinate system a, altered to relative tensor notation, and are thereby expressed in general flowing coordinate systems or materials b, c, d, .... Mirror tensor expressions for ▽ b a λic...id and ▽ b a λic...id exist in a relative geometry G if and (...) only if a rigid coordinate system a exists in G, where ▽ b a λic = λ ,0c ic + λkev ckc aic + λ kc ic v b ckc , ▽jcλic = λ ,jc ic + λkcΓ jc kc ie , and v b aic is the velocity of b relative to a with components in c. These operators are convenient in theoretical analyses and can be incorporated into machine programs for the numerical solution of physical problems. (shrink)

The classical Hamiltonian in generalized coordinates is given asH=1/2 Σ i.k p i g ik p k . We show that there is no operator of the formP i= −iA(qi) (∂/∂qi)+Gi(qi) (note that the Hermitian momentum operatorP i H is of this form) such that the quantum Hamiltonian operatorH Q is given asH Q =1/2 Σ i,k P i g ik P k or1/2 Σ i,k g ik P i P k , etc. In order to maintain a direct transition (...) of this sort from classical to quantum theory, using the classical Hamiltonian as a starting point, we must rely on our previous prescriptions, writing the quantum Hamiltonian asH Q =1/2 Σ i,k P i + g ik P k , whereP i + denotes the adjoint of the operatorP i=−ih ∂/∂qi. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:January 22, 2009 (8:41 pm) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 048red.wpd russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies n.s. 28 (winter 2008–09): 127–42 The Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster U. issn 0036-01631; online 1913-8032 YABLO’S PARADOX AND RUSSELLIAN PROPOSITIONS Gregory Landini Philosophy / U. of Iowa Iowa City, ia 52242–1408, usa [email protected] Is self-reference necessary for the production of Liar paradoxes? Yablo has given an argument that self-reference is not necessary. He (...) hopes to show that the indexical apparatus of self-reference of the traditional Liar paradox can be avoided by appealing to a list, a consecutive sequence, of sentences correlated one-one withnaturalnumbers.Yabloopens his “Paradox without Self-Reference” (Analysis, 1993) with the assumption that there is a sequence such that: Snz: “(;k)(k > n.!. True Sk)” Each sentence on Yablo’s list is supposed to be correlated one-one with number n. Each sentence is supposed to say that for every natural number kz greater than n, the k-th sentence on the list is not true. By comparing Yablo’s construction to an analogous construction with early Russellian propositions, we show that Yablo has failed to generate a paradox. 1. vicious circularity in yablo’s paradox S elf-reference has been taken to be the source of paradoxes. Poincaré and Russell are commonly associated with this thesis. In an amusing passage, the mathematician Jourdain recalls something of the dialogue between them: Nearly all mathematicians agreed that the way to solve these paradoxes was simply not to mention them; but there was some divergence of opinion as to how they were to be unmentioned. It was clearly unsatisfactory merely not to mention them. Thus Poincaré was apparently of the opinion that the best way of avoiding such awkward subjects was to mention that they were not to be mentioned. But [as Russell put it] “one might as well, in talking to a man with January 22, 2009 (8:41 pm) G:\WPData\TYPE2802\russell 28,2 048red.wpd 128 gregory landini 1 Philip Jourdain, The Philosophy of Mr. B*rtr*nd R*ss*llz (London: Allen & Unwin, 1918), p. 77. Russell is quoted from “Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types” (1908), LK, p. 63. 2 “On ‘Insolubilia’ and Their Solution By Symbolic Logic”, in B. Russell, Essays in Analysis, ed. Douglas Lackey (London: Allen & Unwin, 1973), p. 196. 3 I believe that this is Russell’s view in 1906. See Gregory Landini, “Russell’s Separation of the Logical and Semantic Paradoxes”, Revue internationale de philosophie 58 (2004): 257–94 (issue titled “Russell en héritage / Le centenaire des Principes”, ed. Philippe de Rouilhan). a long nose, say: ‘When I speak of noses, I except such as are inordinately long’, which would not be a very successful eTort to avoid a painful topic.”1 Poincaré maintained that one should exclude the oTending cases and therebyavoid“viciouscircles”ofself-referencewhichgenerateparadoxes. Russell objected: We may illustrate this by what M. Poincaré says concerning Richard’s paradox. Having Wrst put E = “all numbers deWnable in a Wnite number of words” we arrive at a paradox, due, says M. Poincaré, to our having included a number only deWnable in a Wnite number of words by means of E. This vicious circle he proposes to avoid by deWning E as “all numbers deWnable in a Wnite number of words without mentioning Ey”. To the uninitiated, this deWnition looks more circular than ever.2 Russell held that some paradoxes such as those of classes require, in order to exclude oTending cases without mentioning them, a “reconstruction of logical Wrst principles”. Others, such as Richard’s, are to be dismissed because they involve confused and viciously circular notions of “deWnability ”.3 Is self-reference necessary for paradoxes? The question is not well crafted. There are quite diTerent notions ofz “self-reference” involved in paradoxes. The self-reference involved in the Liar “This sentence is false” is provided by an apparatus of indexicals. This apparatus is quite distinct from the self-reference involved in Russell’s early ontology of propositions (as mind- and language-independent states of aTairs). This is an ontological self... (shrink)

Disparate attempts exist to identify the key components that make an ethics pedagogy more effective and efficient. To integrate these attempts, a review of 408 articles published in leading journals is conducted. The key foci of extant literature are categorized into three domains labeled as approach, content, and delivery, and a comprehensive framework for ethics pedagogy developed. Within each of these domains, binaries that reflect two alternatives are identified. Approach, the philosophical standpoint, can be theory-laden or real-world connected. Content, the (...) constituencies addressed, can have a focus on breadth or depth. Delivery, the execution of the adopted pedagogy, can be traditional or innovative. The review of articles also identifies the lack of pedagogies that comprehensively focus on all the binaries across domains. The other substantive contribution of this article addresses this gap by developing a generic pedagogy—Integrative Live Case—based on the ACD framework. Based on an incident that is currently unfolding, this pedagogy allows integration of binaries across the three domains. It also allows for a modular course plan that can accommodate varied pedagogical preferences. Volkswagen Dieselgate is presented as a stylized example to showcase the significant advantages of using this pedagogy. (shrink)

resumo É possível distinguir ao menos três etapas principais nas abordagens filosóficas da noção de sujeito: na etapa metafísica a estrutura do sujeito é pens a da em termos de substância; na etapa transcendental , o sujeito é visto como polarida de unificadora de horizontes; na etapa psic a na l í t ica, o sujeito é de f i n ido como estrutura vazia. O sujeito tra ns c e nde ntal é uma estrutura para o mu ndo, enqua (...) nto o sujeito psicanalítico precisa ter uma estrutura em si me s mo para estruturar sua ausênc ia ontológica. Para Lacan, essa ausênc ia ont o l ó g ica se torna manifesta me d ia nte a ling ua gem. A estrutura do sujeito é concebida como uma estrutura de significação. Este artigo compara esses três pontos de vista sobre o sujeito e discute que relevância a idéia de estrutura pode ter para a compreensão do conceito. palavras-chave Sujeito metafísico; sujeito transcendental; sujeito psic a nalítico; estrutura; Platão; Kant; Fichte; Lacan. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A New Fragment of Sophocles and its Schedographic ContextJohn J. KeaneyThe General ContextA popular medium of elementary Byzantine education in grammar and orthography was the genre known as.1 The genre is represented by a (larger or smaller) collection of (brief passages of prose [most frequently] or verse). The individual words of the text are accompanied by a fourfold analysis: (1) interlinear glosses;2 (2 and 3) grammatical and etymological/derivational analysis (...) of individual words; (4) a list of words beginning with the same two or three letters as the word analyzed-each word may or may not be glossed. While these lists quote some well-known texts, the grammatical analyses preserve only two quotations of classical authors; both, by some chance, are of Sophocles.3Our earliest, and necessarily very incomplete, knowledge of the genre comes in references and allusions thereto, like those of Anna Comnena (Alexiad 15.7) or Eustathius (e.g., Comm. in Hom. Il. 1.367.4; [End Page 173] 2.585.16 van der Valk). Between that period and the appearance of the first texts, there arose a traditional core of (hereafter skhedē).4 The earliest representatives of this core were written in the south of Italy at the end of the thirteenth century. These, with the folia containing our text, are B (Barberinianus Graecus 102:1290/1 [subscription]: fol. 60 v); P (Parisinus Graecus 25745: fol. 61 r) written by Nicolaus Hagiopetrite\s in Galatina; N (Par. Gr. 2572:1295/6 [subscription]: fol. 51 v) by one Georgius, son of the protopapas Leo, of Ardeo; and M (Monacensis Graecus 272: fol. 42 v). These represent one6 branch of the oldest class of manuscripts (class Ia). The four manuscripts are related, as shown by the fact that they preserve the same order of skhedē throughout. N and M are closely related for they add a final skhedos not found in B and P. A second branch (Ib) is represented by Pal (Palatinus Graecus 927: fol. 26 v), R (Reginenses, PP Pii II 15: fol. 206 v8), and C (Conventi Soppressi 29: fol. 40 v).The Specific ContextThe ninth of the traditional skhedē is[End Page 174]The word analyzed is. The text:A.A.B.C.D. om. PalRAlthough the text is badly transmitted,10 it is all but certain that it goes back, ultimately, to Herodian.11 The closest parallel passage12 is from the Peri dikhronōn (2.15.11-27 Lehrs):[End Page 175] (δ 511).A. B. (F36 Kassel-Austin).Some Sophoclean Usage(1) is found once (Ph. 945). (2) With compare Ai. 543: and Ant. 548: (3) For the polarity of "mind" and, see OT 524-24: F 929.1-2 Radt:. For as a feature of the Sophoclean hero, see Knox 1964, 21.John J. KeaneyPrinceton University e-mail: [email protected], J., and J. Irigoin, eds. 1977. La Paléographie grecque et byzantine. Paris: Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique. Google ScholarCanart, P. 1977. "Un Style d'écriture livresque dans les manuscrits chypriotes du XIVe siècle: La Chypriote 'bouclée.'" In Bompaire and Irigoin, 303-21.Constantinides, C. N., and R. Browning. 1993. Dated Greek Manuscripts from Cyprus to the Year 1570. Nicosia: Cyprus Research Center. Google ScholarDyck, A. 1993. "Aelius Herodian: Recent Studies and Prospects for Future Research." ANRW 2.34.1:772-94. Berlin: de Gruyter. Google Scholar---, ed. 1995. Epimerismi Homerici. 2d part. Sammlung griechischer und lateinischer Grammatiker 5/2. Berlin: de Gruyter. Google ScholarGallavotti, C. 1983. "Nota sulla schedographia di Moscopulo e suoi precedenti fino a Teodoro Prodromo." BPEC, 3d ser., 4:1-35. Google ScholarGamillscheg, E. 1950. "Zur handschriften Überlieferung byzantinischen Schulbücher." JÖB 43:211-30. Google ScholarHunger, H. 1978. Die hochsprachliche Literatur der Byzantiner. Vol. 2. Munich: C. H. Beck. [End Page 176]Google ScholarKassel, R., and C. Austin. 1991. Poetae Comici Graeci. Vol. 2. Berlin: de Gruyter. Google ScholarKeaney, J. J. 1971. "Moschopulea." BZ 63:303-21. Google ScholarKnox, B. M. W. 1964. The Heroic Temper. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Google ScholarLehrs, K... (shrink)

Before talking about national science as a specific phenomenon we find out the essence of science as a phenomenon in general. We note that science is one of the most complex phenomena of social life. Complex understanding of it complicates the fact that science is structurally extremely complex, polyfunctional, historically variable, with many of its faces included in this or that sphere of social life. It therefore appears as an extremely diverse social phenomenon. This raises some difficulties in developing a (...) general definition of it. As G. Volkov correctly pointed out, "there is nothing simpler than giving a definition to any phenomenon, when the whole thing is only in the formulation, and there is nothing more complicated than when it comes to the concentration in the concentrated form of the very essence of the object under study". (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RUSSELL TO FREGE, 24 MAY 1903: "I BELIEVE I HAVE DISCOVERED THAT CLASSES ARE ENTIRELY SUPERFLUOUS" GREGORY LANDINI Philosophy / University of Iowa Iowa City, IA 52242, USA It was his consideration of Cantor's proof that there is no greatest cardinal, Russell recalls in My Philosophical Development, that led in the spring of 1901 to the discovery of the paradox of the class of all classes not members of (...) themselves. "Never glad confident morning again", were Whitehead's reported words (MPD, p. 58). Whitehead was, of course, wrong. Russell had many new confident mornings. One in particular apparently occurred on 19 May 1903. On 23 May Russell wrote in his journal: "Four days ago 1 solved the Contradiction -the relief of this is unspeakable" (Papm 12: 24). The "solution" was communicated to Whitehead, who responded by telegram: "Heartiest congratulations Aristoteles secundus. 1 am delighted" (Clark, p. III). But it was not long before Russell knew his proposal was inadequate. On the form he would scrawl: "A propos of solVing the Contradiction. [But the solution was wrong]" (ibid; Russell's brackets). The episode is intriguing. What was the proposal? Russell's correspondence with Frege sheds some light. On 20 October 1902 Frege had sent a letter suggesting a way to avoid the contradiction. Frege's suggestion, formulated in a great hurry so that it might appear in the Appendix of Vol. II of the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, was to abandon his Basic Law V; zcj>z =zez. ==. (x)(x. ==. ex), and to replace it by Russell to Frege, 24 May I903 161 V' zz =zez. ==. (x)(x *zz & x* zez: ~ : x. ==. ex). The underlying idea was to accept that one concept may have the same extension as another even though the two concepts are not coextensive. Though he thought the underlying idea "probably correct",! Russell expressed reservation in a reply of 12 December:... I find it difficult to accept your solution even though it is probably correct. Do you deny, e.g., that all classes form a class? And if this is admitted, then it is possible that - ana. Moreover, the class of non-humans is a. non-human. Otherwise it must be admitted that not ail objects fall either under a or not-a; namely, if a is a range of values, then a fails neither under a nor under not-a. This contradicts the law of excluded middle, which will be inconvenient to say the least.2 (Frege I980, p. 151) Frege's response of 28 December does not mention the contradiction, and Volume II of his Grundgesetze appeared early in 1903. Russell's reservations concerning Frege's solution· continue in a letter to Frege of 20 February 1903: What you say about my contradiction is of the greatest interest to me. Do you believe that the range of values remains unchanged if some subclass of the class is assigned to it as a new member? Extension seems to fit this view better than intension. Bur I fe;el far from clear about this question. (Frege I980, p. 155) Frege replied on 21 May, explaining that in general a class does not remain unchanged when a particular subclass is added to it, but that two concepts may have the same extension (the same class) when the only difference between them is that this class falls under the first concept but not under the second (p. 157). Then on 24 May 1903 Russell excitedly wrote Frege of a solution of the paradox of classes: "I received your letter this morning, and 1 am replying to it at once, for russell: the Journal of the Berrrand Russdl Archives McMasrer University Library Press n.S.•2 (wincer 1992-93): 160-85 ISSN 0036-01631 • The same evaluation appears in Russell's Appendix to The Principles ofMathematics (p. 522). 2 Frege's '\- a II b" is Peano and Russell's "a E b". Russell should have put "~ana". 162 GREGORY LANDINI I believe I have discovered that classes are entirely superfluous. Your designation i(z) can be used for itself, and x E i(z) for (x).... this seems to me to avoid the contradiction" (p. 159). The proposal is also mentioned in a... (shrink)

In questo volume sono raccolti gli scritti frutto della ricerca effettuata nell’ambito del Progetto: “Ontologia Formale e Ontologie: uno Strumento per il Dialogo Interdisciplinare e Interculturale”. Scopo del progetto è mostrare al pubblico intellettuale italiano, sia di estrazione scientifica che umanistica, le potenzialità dello strumento dell’ontologia in generale, e dell’ontologia formale in particolare, per il dialogo costruttivo interdisciplinare e interculturale. Dialogo interdisciplinare per il rapporto fra discipline scientifiche e umanistiche, dialogo interculturale per il rapporto fra le diverse culture e religioni (...) in una società globalizzata. (shrink)